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DISTINGUISHING THE VIGILANT FROM THE 
VIGILANTE IN SELF-DEFENSE LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
The right of self-defense is “intended to preserve the 
legal order by granting every person the right to fend off 
unlawful attacks.”1 The state essentially grants an exception to 
its usual monopoly on the use of force and allows an individual 
to act as a “substitute policeman.”2 That right, however, is 
subject to certain restrictions. Among those restrictions is the 
requirement in most jurisdictions that the individual claiming 
self-defense cannot have provoked the conflict.3 The precise 
contours of what constitutes provocation vary by jurisdiction.4  
Each jurisdiction, to some extent, leaves unanswered the 
question of whether individuals can intentionally insert themselves 
into situations where violence is reasonably foreseeable and still 
maintain a claim of self-defense. The key problem in making these 
determinations is distinguishing between vigilant community 
members hoping to protect their communities and vigilantes 
seeking to mete out their own brand of extrajudicial law 
enforcement. While the former may be socially desirable, a society 
of laws can have little tolerance for the latter. Defining the 
boundary between these behaviors requires a carefully crafted rule 
that “implements [society’s] collective sense of justice.”5  
Perhaps the highest profile case to implicate these issues 
in recent memory arose on February 26, 2012, when George 
Zimmerman shot Trayvon Martin.6 Zimmerman maintained that 
  
 1 Mordechai Kremnitzer & Khalid Ghanayim, Proportionality and the 
Aggressor’s Culpability in Self-Defense, 39 TULSA L. REV. 875, 899 (2004). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Margaret Raymond, Looking for Trouble: Framing and the Dignitary 
Interest in the Law of Self-Defense, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 287, 294 (2010). 
 4 Id. at 294-95. 
 5 Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One’s Own Defense: A Study 
in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1985). 
 6 Lizette Alvarez & Timothy Williams, Documents Tell Zimmerman’s Side in 
Martin Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/22/us/ 
documents-tell-zimmermans-side-in-martin-shooting.html. 
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he acted in self-defense,7 while critics claimed that race 
motivated the shooting.8 The incident and the subsequent police 
response sparked a heated national dialogue on race,9 gun 
control,10 hoodies,11 and Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law.12 
Largely lost in the debate, however, was the question of 
whether Zimmerman even had the right to assert self-defense 
in the first place. Zimmerman said he followed a suspicious 
character through a Florida neighborhood at night.13 In doing 
so, did he provoke the subsequent altercation, thus barring him 
from claiming self-defense? 
Zimmerman’s questionable case of self-defense is hardly 
unique. In Seattle, another individual is blurring the boundaries 
between vigilant and vigilante. Phoenix Jones is the “self-
proclaimed Seattle superhero.”14 For his nighttime crime-fighting 
patrols, Jones wears a “skintight black-and-gold, belted costume, 
a cape and a fedora.”15 In one incident, Jones stepped between two 
  
 7 Id. 
 8 Bianca Prieto, Trayvon Martin: “We Are Gathered Here Today to Demand 
Justice” in Teen’s Fatal Shooting, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 14, 2012), 
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-03-14/news/os-trayvon-martin-shooting-death-
rally-20120314_1_shooting-death-bryant-chief-bill-lee. 
 9 Patrik Jonsson, Trayvon Martin Shooting: A Turning Point in Gun Rights 
Debate?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/ 
Justice/2012/0419/Trayvon-Martin-shooting-a-turning-point-in-gun-rights-debate (“The 
Feb. 26 shooting of the unarmed teenager in Sanford, Fla., by neighborhood watch 
captain George Zimmerman, and the initial police decision not to charge Mr. 
Zimmerman, sparked a national debate about race and violence in American society.”). 
 10 Id. 
 11 Gail Collins, More Guns, Fewer Hoodies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/opinion/collins-more-guns-fewer-hoodies.html 
(“The debate over the shooting death of Trayvon Martin seems to be devolving into an 
argument about the right to wear hoodies, but it really does not appear to be a 
promising development.”). 
 12 Toluse Olorunnipa, Stand Your Ground Law’s Impact Needs More Study, 
Task Force Told, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.tampabay.com/news/ 
politics/stateroundup/stand-your-ground-laws-impact-needs-more-study-task-force-told/ 
1251191 (“Gov. Rick Scott commissioned the task force [to examine Florida’s ‘Stand 
Your Ground’ law] in the wake of the February shooting death of Miami Gardens 
teenager Trayvon Martin, which thrust the state’s controversial gun laws into a 
national spotlight.”). Among other things, the “Stand Your Ground” law eliminated the 
duty to retreat for any individual “who is attacked in any . . . place where he or she has 
a right to be . . . .” FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2011). 
 13 New Video, Audio Released of Zimmerman’s Account of Fatal Fight, CBS 
MIAMI (June 21, 2012, 6:25 PM), http://miami.cbslocal.com/2012/06/21/prosecutors-
release-video-of-zimmermans-account-of-fatal-fight/. 
 14 Casey McNerthney, Seattle Police Arrest “Superhero” Phoenix Jones in Assault 
Investigation, SEATTLEPI.COM (Oct. 10, 2011, 11:39 AM), http://www.seattlepi.com/ 
local/article/Seattle-police-arrest-superhero-Phoenix-Jones-2210657.php. 
 15 Jessica Hopper & Neal Karlinsky, Real-Life Superhero Gets Nose Broken, 
ABC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/US/real-life-seattle-superhero-phoenix- 
jones-suffers-broken/story?id=12589895#.UFstJ0K0Lww.  
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men who looked like they were about to fight.16 At that point, both 
men turned on Jones.17 According to Jones, one of the men had a 
gun and “start[ed] swinging on me and start[ed] an altercation 
with me.”18 Would the law of self-defense protect Jones if he 
fought back? Or had Jones provoked the incident by intentionally 
inserting himself into the middle of the altercation? 
Controversial questions over the right to assert self-
defense are pervasive in the criminal law. In Pennsylvania, 
Spencer Newcomer claimed self-defense after he stopped his car 
and shot a man who had been following him after an earlier 
argument.19 Newcomer claimed he thought the man was drawing 
a gun, but had he provoked the incident by stopping his car in the 
first place? In Massachusetts, Santano Dessin shot a man after 
an argument that prosecutors contended Dessin provoked so he 
could claim self-defense.20 Does aggressively confronting another 
individual preclude a self-defense claim when the individual 
responds aggressively to that confrontation? In North Carolina, 
Roy Lowman’s wife shot a man who was beating her husband 
with a metal pipe.21 The police said it was a clear case of self-
defense, but Lowman had initially confronted his attacker to stop 
him from hitting the Lowmans’ car with the pipe.22 Can Lowman 
claim self-defense after he inserted himself into a situation so 
obviously fraught with the possibility of violence? 
This note will argue that courts should apply a 
reasonableness standard to questions of provocation in self-
defense cases. By replacing the confusing and contradictory 
standards currently in place for determining provocation, a 
reasonableness standard will offer a more coherent analysis, 
which will enable jurors to reach just results that adequately 
and fairly distinguish between the vigilant and the vigilante.  
Part I of this note will provide an overview of the 
various self-defense provocation exceptions in jurisdictions 
across the country, focusing on three broad frameworks: Any 
  
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Rick Lee, Judge: Spencer Newcomer Can Argue Self-Defense at Murder 
Trial, YORK DAILY REC. (Nov. 23, 2012, 11:34 PM), http://www.ydr.com/crime/ci_ 
22054704/judge-spencer-newcomer-can-argue-self-defense-at. 
 20 Jarret Bencks, Prosecutor: Somerville Shooting Set Up to Appear as Self-
Defense, BOSTON.COM (Nov. 16, 2012, 2:35 PM), http://www.boston.com/yourtown/news/ 
somerville/2012/11/prosecutor_somerville_shooting.html. 
 21 Jessica Pickens, Sheriff: Man Shot in Self Defense, SHELBY STAR (Nov. 3, 
2012), http://www.shelbystar.com/news/sheriff-man-shot-in-self-defense-1.43252. 
 22 Id. 
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Provocation, Straight Provocation, and Provocation with 
Intent. Part II will examine the particular circumstances 
surrounding the incidents involving George Zimmerman and 
Phoenix Jones and address how those circumstances and others 
would fare under the various frameworks discussed in Part I. 
Part III will propose a standard of reasonableness to apply in all 
cases where an actor claiming self-defense may have provoked 
the incident by intentionally inserting himself into a foreseeably 
dangerous situation. Part IV will apply the reasonableness 
standard to the cases of Zimmerman and Jones as a means of 
illustrating the benefits and clarity of such a standard.  
I. THE PROVOCATION EXCEPTION TO SELF-DEFENSE 
CLAIMS 
There is wide support in both statutory and common 
law for the proposition that individuals claiming self-defense 
cannot have brought the conflict on themselves.23 In other 
words, the actor cannot have provoked the incident. What 
counts as provocation is significantly less clear. In common 
usage, provoke means to “incite to anger or resentment,” to 
“stir to action or feeling,” to “give rise; to bring about,” or to 
“bring about deliberately; induce.”24 Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines provocation as follows: “1. The act of inciting another to 
do something, esp. to commit a crime. 2. Something (such as 
words or actions) that affects a person’s reason and self-control, 
esp. causing the person to commit a crime impulsively.”25 
Beyond the dictionary definitions, different jurisdictions frame 
the issue of provocation in different ways.  
Provocation, as it is understood in the courts, exists on a 
spectrum ranging from “any causal contribution”26 to provoking 
a fight with a person “with [the] intent to cause bodily injury to 
that person.”27 Yet this variation seems to be largely 
unrecognized in the literature. Even general application 
treatises intended for multiple jurisdictions tend to offer only 
one definition of provocation, though that variation differs from 
  
 23 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, § 3.04 cmt. 4(b) (Official Draft 1985). 
 24 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1419 
(5th ed. 2011). Interestingly, only the fourth definition requires any intentionality for 
provocation. This indicates that, at least in common usage, provocation does not have 
to be deliberate. 
 25 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1346 (9th ed. 2009). 
 26 Robinson, supra note 5, at 4. 
 27 INDIANA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Criminal Instruction No. 10.03A (2013). 
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treatise to treatise and does not indicate that the standard may 
vary by jurisdiction.28 While some sources recognize that 
provocation does not have a single definition across all 
jurisdictions,29 they fail to lay out a comprehensive picture of the 
range of definitions available. This note rectifies that omission.  
Generally, the ways that jurisdictions define 
provocation can be divided into three broad categories: Any 
Provocation, Straight Provocation, and Provocation with 
Intent. These different frames are not mutually exclusive, and 
behavior that falls within one frame may also fall within 
another. It might be helpful to think of these three frames as 
increasingly shrinking concentric circles within a Euler diagram. 
The Any Provocation frame, for instance, incorporates all of the 
behaviors addressed by subsequent frames. Each successive 
frame then addresses a correspondingly narrower spectrum of 
behavior. Each frame is discussed separately below.30  
A. Any Provocation 
The first and most sweeping framing of the provocation 
question requires the actor to be essentially blameless in the 
instigation of a conflict before asserting a claim of self-defense. 
In perhaps the clearest statement of this definitional frame, 
the South Carolina pattern jury instructions call for a judge to 
charge a jury that “the defendant must be without fault in 
bringing on the difficulty” to claim self-defense.31 Washington, 
D.C. goes further. There, “One who deliberately puts 
himself/herself in a position where s/he has reason to believe 
that his/her presence will provoke trouble cannot claim self-
defense.”32 In Washington, D.C., defendants claiming self-
defense must show not only that they did not instigate the 
conflict, but also that they did not put themselves into a 
  
 28 See, e.g., 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4 (2d ed. 2012) (“One who is 
not the aggressor in an encounter is justified in using a reasonable amount of force 
against his adversary . . . .”); 22 C.J.S. CRIMINAL LAW § 60 (2013) (“A party invoking 
self-defense must be without fault with regard to causing the altercation.”). These two 
descriptions fit the Straight Provocation and Any Provocation frames, respectively. 
Each frame will be discussed in turn below. 
 29 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 226 (5th ed. 2009). 
 30 The descriptions of these frames will necessarily be limited to a broad 
overview rather than an in-depth examination of any one frame. 
 31 South Carolina Jury Instructions Criminal § 6-6. Similarly, Virginia only 
allows a defendant to claim self-defense where he or she was “without fault in 
provoking or bringing on” the altercation. 2-52 Virginia Model Jury Instructions, 
Criminal Instruction No. 52.500. 
 32 1-IX Criminal Jury Instructions for DC, Instruction § 9.504(a). 
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position where they has reason to believe that another 
individual would instigate a conflict. As the D.C. Circuit Court 
has ruled, “before a person can avail himself of the plea of self-
defense against the charge of homicide, he must do everything 
in his power, consistent with his safety, to avoid the danger 
and avoid the necessity of taking life.”33 Under this frame, 
simply having reason to believe that a conflict will result from 
an action, even absent culpable behavior, is provocation.  
The Any Provocation frame places a heavy burden on 
individuals seeking to claim self-defense. Such individuals 
must not do anything they know might lead to trouble, let alone 
take affirmative steps to provoke the incident. Thus, provocation 
can mean little more than being somewhere an individual has 
reason to believe is the wrong place at the wrong time.34 While 
the language courts have employed has been described as an 
“overstatement,”35 various courts’ application of the language 
indicates that it is still a remarkably broad standard. 
In South Carolina, the courts have interpreted the 
provocation limitation to mean that “[a]ny act of the accused in 
violation of law and reasonably calculated to produce the 
occasion amounts to bringing on the difficulty and bars [the] 
right to assert self-defense . . . .”36 In State v. Slater, the 
defendant, carrying a gun illegally, approached an ongoing 
robbery in a parking lot.37 Slater testified that he approached 
the commotion and surprised one of the robbers, who turned on 
him with a gun.38 Slater said that he then ran away and fired 
his gun behind him when he heard shots being fired at him.39 
Slater left the scene and the victim died of the shots Slater 
fired.40 The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the trial 
court properly denied Slater’s request for a jury instruction on 
self-defense because he was not without fault in “bringing on 
  
 33 Laney v. United States, 294 F. 412, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Though ninety 
years old, this proposition still stands as good law. See, e.g., Young v. Scales, 873 A.2d 
337, 343 (D.C. 2005); Sams v. United States, 721 A.2d 945, 953 (D.C. 1998) (“On 
several occasions we have refused to depart from the principles set forth in Laney.”). 
 34 See, e.g., Howard v. United States, 656 A.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C. 1995) (“We 
have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that self-defense may not be claimed by one 
who deliberately places himself [or herself] in a position where he [or she] has reason to 
believe his or her presence . . . would provoke trouble.” (brackets in original) (quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 35 DRESSLER, supra note 29, at 226. 
 36 State v. Bryant, 520 S.E.2d 319, 322 (S.C. 1999). 
 37 644 S.E.2d 50, 51 (S.C. 2007). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 51-52. 
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the difficulty.”41 As the court explained, “In the instant case, the 
record clearly reflects that Slater approached an altercation that 
was already underway with a loaded weapon by his side. Such 
activity could be reasonably calculated to bring the difficulty 
that arose in this case.”42 In other words, the defendant could not 
intentionally insert himself into a situation where violence was 
reasonably likely to result and then claim that he acted in self-
defense when violence did result. Tellingly, nothing in the 
court’s opinion would suggest a different result if Slater had 
approached the robbery with the intent of aiding the individual 
being robbed.43 In this case, the court found that Slater had 
provoked the incident in question, even though he joined an 
altercation that had already turned violent before his arrival. 
In Scott v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of 
Virginia held that a defendant could not claim self-defense, 
even where the victim struck the first blow, if the defendant’s 
actions brought on that blow.44 In Scott, the defendant, upset 
that his friends had been arrested, confronted the town 
policeman’s son.45 The defendant said that the policeman was a 
“G d s o a b” as well as a “bootlegger and a gambler.”46 In 
response, the policeman’s son “struck [the defendant] with steel 
[knuckles] on the nose and [beat] him with the [knuckles] while 
they were fighting upon the ground” until the defendant 
stabbed and killed him.47 The court held that even though the 
victim had initiated the physical altercation, the defendant still 
could not claim self-defense under Virginia law because the 
necessity for such a defense arose from the defendant’s own 
actions.48 A defendant who provokes an incident, even verbally, 
is precluded from asserting a valid claim of self-defense under 
the Any Provocation frame.49  
  
 41 Id. at 52. 
 42 Id. 
 43 See generally Slater, 644 S.E.2d 50. 
 44 Scott v. Commonwealth, 129 S.E. 360, 362 (Va. 1925). Though dated, Scott is still 
frequently cited in treatises on Virginia’s self-defense laws. See, e.g., 40 C.J.S. HOMICIDE § 189 
(2012); Craig D. Johnston, VIRGINIA PRACTICE TRIAL HANDBOOK § 4:13 (2012 ed.). 
 45 Scott, 129 S.E. at 361. 
 46 Id. These insults are quoted from the court’s opinion. Presumably, Scott used 
actual profanity rather than mere initialism while addressing the policeman’s son. 
 47 Id. at 361-62. 
 48 Id. at 362. 
 49 Id. 
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B. Straight Provocation 
Establishing a less-exacting standard than the Any 
Provocation frame, jurisdictions applying the Straight 
Provocation frame preclude the claim of self-defense where the 
defendant acted as the aggressor in the conflict. For instance, 
in federal courts, “[t]he law recognizes the right of a person 
who is not the aggressor to stand his ground and use force to 
defend himself or another.”50 Similarly, in Florida, the 
defendant cannot claim self-defense if the jury finds that the 
defendant “initially provoked the use of force against 
[himself].”51 Arizona, Kansas, Maryland, Tennessee, and Texas 
have likewise adopted the Straight Provocation frame.52 
Notably, Straight Provocation includes a degree of 
culpability that is not necessary under the Any Provocation 
frame.53 As the Arizona Supreme Court held: 
Before an act may cause forfeiture of the fundamental right of self-
defense it must be willingly and knowingly calculated to lead to conflict. 
. . . [One] who merely does an act which affords an opportunity for 
conflict is not thereby precluded from claiming self-defense.54 
Thus, under the Straight Provocation frame, the mere 
knowledge that one’s presence may provoke a conflict is not 
enough to preclude a claim of self-defense.55 Instead, an 
individual’s presence only counts as provocation if it is 
  
 50 1-8 MODERN FED. JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL § 8.08 (emphasis added). 
 51 FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 3.6(f), available 
at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/jury_instructions/instructions.shtml. 
 52 See REVISED ARIZ. JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) 3d § 4.04, available at 
http://www.azbar.org/media/292098/2011_cumulative_supplement.pdf (“The threat or 
use of physical force is not justified . . . [i]f the defendant provoked the other’s use of 
unlawful force . . . .”); PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS FOR KANSAS CIV. 4TH § 52.250 (“A person 
who initially provokes the use of force against [himself] is not permitted to use force to 
defend [himself] . . . .”); MD. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL § 5:07 (“You 
have heard evidence that the defendant acted in self-defense. Self-defense is a complete 
defense and you are required to find the defendant not guilty if . . . the defendant was 
not the aggressor . . . .”); TENN. PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL § 40.06, available at 
http://www.tncrimlaw.com/TPI_Crim/40_06.htm (“The [threat] [use] of force against 
another is not justified if the defendant provoked the [deceased’s] [alleged victim’s] 
[use] [attempted use] of unlawful force . . . .” (brackets in original)); TEX. CRIMINAL 
PATTERN JURY CHARGES—DEFENSES § B15.3 (“Therefore, in deciding whether the state 
has proved that the defendant did not reasonably believe his use of deadly force was 
necessary, you must not consider any failure of the defendant to retreat that might be 
shown by the evidence if you find both—(1) the defendant did not provoke . . . the 
person against whom the defendant used deadly force; and (2) the defendant was not 
engaged in criminal activity at the time he used the deadly force.”). 
 53 See Robinson, supra note 5, at 6. 
 54 State v. Jackson, 382 P.2d 229, 232 (Ariz. 1963). 
 55 See id. 
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“deliberately calculated to lead to further conflict.”56 This is the 
difference between reasonable belief and intention. Under this 
frame, individuals must intend to provoke a conflict before they 
are precluded from claiming self-defense.57 Merely having reason 
to believe that their actions will provoke conflict is not enough. 
The Texas case, La Farn v. State,58 provides a clear 
example of the application of the Straight Provocation frame. 
In La Farn, the defendant and the victim engaged in an 
altercation at a dance hall.59 The defendant followed the victim 
outside and shot at him.60 The court held that firing the first 
shot “forfeited [the] appellant’s right of self defense, and it 
[was] of no moment as to whether the deceased was armed or 
not at the time he was finally killed by the appellant’s third 
bullet.”61 Even when the victim fired back, the defendant could 
not claim self-defense because he had provoked the incident by 
firing the first shot.62 This case illustrates the Straight 
Provocation frame because the defendant here initially acted to 
instigate the conflict. Even if, by the end of the encounter, the 
defendant shot to save his own life, he started the gunfight. 
Given this, the court held that the defendant had provoked the 
incident and could not then claim to act in self-defense. 
In Marquardt v. State, the Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals applied the Straight Provocation frame to a 
defendant’s attempt to claim self-defense for an assault charge. 
In that case, the defendant broke into the victim’s home 
searching for his wife, who was pregnant and who the 
defendant believed was smoking crack.63 The defendant had 
armed himself with a baseball bat before entering the home 
because he believed “his wife may have been in the company of 
violent individuals.”64 Upon the defendant breaking into the 
victim’s apartment, the victim started running toward the 
defendant with something in his hand.65 The defendant, not 
  
 56 Id. 
 57 The intent element under this frame should not be confused with the 
Provocation with Intent frame, discussed below. Under Straight Provocation, the 
required intention is merely to create conflict. Provocation with Intent requires a 
greater showing. See infra, Part I.C. 
 58 La Farn v. State, 265 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954). 
 59 Id. at 817. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 819. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Marquardt v. State, 882 A.2d 900, 909-10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005). 
 64 Id. at 927. 
 65 Id. at 910. 
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wanting to “take a chance,” hit the victim in the head with the 
bat.66 The court 
acknowledge[d] that the privilege of self-defense is not necessarily 
forfeited by arming one’s self in anticipation of an attack, but that right 
is qualified by the proviso that the right only extends to one who was not 
in any sense seeking an encounter. Here, appellant provoked the 
encounter by breaking and entering into [the victim’s] apartment. The 
circuit court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense.67 
Although the prospect of an armed, charging individual 
seems to present a classic case in which self-defense can be 
employed, the defendant forfeited any claim to self-defense by 
breaking into the victim’s apartment. At that point, the 
defendant had provoked the victim’s response and could not 
subsequently claim self-defense. It is significant, however, that 
the mere act of “arming one’s self in anticipation of an attack”68 
does not give rise to provocation under the Straight 
Provocation frame. Arguably, preparation for conflict could 
preclude a claim of self-defense under the Any Provocation 
frame because doing so would indicate that the person had 
“reason to believe that his/her presence will provoke trouble.”69 
Yet that belief is not enough under the Straight Provocation 
frame. Under Straight Provocation, the defendant must have 
exhibited actual misconduct by intending to provoke a conflict.70 
C. Provocation with Intent 
The narrowest frame for precluding an individual from 
claiming self-defense on provocation grounds is Provocation 
with Intent. Unlike the Straight Provocation frame, where the 
intent to provoke any confrontation eliminates the right to 
claim self-defense,71 the defendant must intend to provoke the 
victim for the purpose of doing serious harm under the 
Provocation with Intent frame. The Delaware pattern jury 
instructions articulate this frame by charging that a defendant 
cannot assert self-defense where “the defendant, with the 
purpose of causing death or serious physical injury, provoked 
  
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 927 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 68 Id. 
 69 1-IX CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR DC INSTRUCTION § 9.504(a). 
 70 See State v. Jackson, 382 P.2d 229, 232 (Ariz. 1963). 
 71 Id. 
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the use of force in the same encounter.”72 In Pennsylvania, to 
preclude the right to self-defense because the defendant 
provoked the conflict, the prosecution must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant provoked the incident 
with the “conscious object to cause death or serious bodily 
injury.”73 Pennsylvania juries are further charged that 
“[c]onduct that is not of such a nature does not constitute the 
kind of provocation upon which the Commonwealth may rely to 
prove its case.”74 Thus, only defendants who act with the intent 
of provoking a conflict meant to cause serious harm to the 
victim are precluded from asserting self-defense in 
Pennsylvania. These instructions are typical of jurisdictions 
that apply the Provocation with Intent frame, including 
Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, and Kentucky.75  
The Delaware case, White v. State,76 illustrates the 
Provocation with Intent frame. In that case, the defendant 
fired his gun at the victim after the victim had robbed the 
defendant’s friend earlier in the day.77 It did not matter for self-
defense purposes if the victim later returned fire, because the 
defendant had acted “with the purpose of causing death or 
serious physical injury” in the same encounter.78 Firing a gun at 
  
 72 DEL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL § 5.14, available at 
http://courts.delaware.gov/superior/pattern/pattern_criminal_jury_rev_2012.pdf. 
 73 PA. SUGGESTED STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) § 9.501. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.81.330 (2006) (“A person is justified in using 
nondeadly force upon another when and to the extent the person reasonably believes it 
is necessary for self-defense against what the person reasonably believes to be the use 
of unlawful force by the other person, unless . . . the person claiming self-defense 
provoked the other’s conduct with intent to cause physical injury to the other . . . .”); 
HAW. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION 7.01 (“The use of deadly force is not justifiable if the 
defendant, with the intent of causing death or serious bodily injury, provoked the use of 
force against himself/herself in the same encounter, or if the defendant knows that 
he/she can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating.”); 
PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS FOR KAN. CRIMINAL 4TH § 52.240 (“A person is not permitted to 
provoke an attack on [himself] with the specific intention to use such attack as a 
justification for inflicting bodily harm upon the person [he] provoked and then claim 
self-defense as a justification for inflicting bodily harm upon the person [he] 
provoked.”); 1-11 KY. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 11.12 (“Provided, however, that if you 
believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant provoked [the 
victim] to use or attempt to use physical force upon him, and that he did so with the 
intention of causing death or serious physical injury to [the victim], then the defense of 
self-protection is not available to him . . . .”). 
 76 White v. State, 957 A.2d 2 (Del. 2008). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
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another person clearly falls within the range of behavior 
intended to cause death or serious injury.79 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. 
Samuel80 offers another telling application of the Provocation 
with Intent frame. In this case, the limits of the frame are 
highlighted by the court’s ruling on what falls outside those 
limits. In Samuel, the court held that even behavior that is 
provocative within the ordinary use of the word does not forfeit 
a defendant’s right to claim self-defense so long as the 
defendant did not provoke the incident “with the intent to 
cause death or serious bodily injury.”81 In Samuel, the 
defendant, in an effort to encourage the victim to leave an 
apartment, brought a gun into the room where they were 
sitting and placed it on the table.82 While acknowledging that 
the display of the gun “could be seen as provocative,”83 the court 
held that it did not constitute provocation for self-defense 
purposes because there was “no suggestion that the [defendant] 
had pointed the gun at the victim, that he had physically 
assaulted the victim, that he had threatened the victim, or that 
he had any physical contact with the victim.”84 Put differently, 
the defendant had not manifested any “intent to cause death or 
serious bodily injury.”85 The defendant, therefore, could still 
claim self-defense when he shot the victim after the victim had 
left the room and returned with a sawed-off shotgun.86 The 
Samuel case underscores a key feature of the Provocation with 
Intent frame—namely, that the court looks not only for 
provocation, but for a specific kind of provocation. This marks 
the crucial difference between the Straight Provocation and 
Provocation with Intent frames. Absent the particular intent to do 
serious harm to the victim, even behavior that would generally be 
considered provocative does not preclude a defendant from 
  
 79 The similarities in the facts of this case and La Farn v. State, discussed 
above, illustrate the non-exclusivity of the different frames. Here, behavior that falls 
within the Provocation with Intent frame also falls within the Straight Provocation 
frame, though the inverse is not necessarily true. 
 80 Commonwealth v. Samuel, 590 A.2d 1245 (Pa. 1991). 
 81 Id. at 1248. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 1249. 
 84 Id. at 1248. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 1249. This holding was further bolstered by the victim’s decision to 
leave the room and return with a gun, which the court wrote shifted the balance 
between the parties and placed the victim “in the position of being the aggressor.” Id. 
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asserting a viable claim of self-defense under Provocation with 
Intent. 
The narrowness of the Provocation with Intent frame is 
particularly clear when compared directly with the broader 
frames adopted in other jurisdictions. In an Any Provocation 
jurisdiction, merely being in a place where the individual has 
reason to think a punch will be thrown is enough to constitute 
provocation.87 In a Straight Provocation jurisdiction, the thrower 
of the first punch cannot claim self-defense after the second 
person hits back.88 In a Provocation with Intent jurisdiction, it is 
not even necessarily provocation within the meaning of the law to 
throw the first punch.89 Rather, the individual who throws that 
punch must have had the “conscious object” of instigating an 
altercation intended to cause the victim’s death or serious bodily 
injury.90 Only in that exceptionally limited circumstance has the 
defendant “provoked” the subsequent response and forfeited his 
right to claim self-defense. 
II. FRAMES OF PROVOCATION IN PRACTICE 
Having laid out a basic framework for how provocation 
is defined across different jurisdictions, it will be instructive to 
examine how those frames apply to fact patterns drawn from 
current events. This application will illuminate the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of each frame and highlight the need 
for a new approach to the question of provocation. 
A. Case Studies—Underlying Facts 
1. George Zimmerman 
George Zimmerman’s shooting of Trayvon Martin 
“sparked a national debate about race and violence in American 
society.”91 Yet the facts remain clouded in controversy. 
Zimmerman said that he acted only to defend himself against an 
attack, while his critics claimed that he followed Martin and 
fired the fatal shots because of Martin’s race.92 These two 
  
 87 See, e.g., Howard v. United States, 656 A.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C. 1995). 
 88 See, e.g., FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 3.6(f). 
 89 See, e.g., PA. SUGGESTED STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIM.) § 9.501. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Jonsson, supra note 9. 
 92 In reality, this dichotomy may be a false one. See generally L. Song 
Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. 
REV. 293 (2012). Professors Richardson and Goff posit a “suspicion heuristic” to explain 
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interpretations of events can be designated the “Z narrative” 
(the account that Zimmerman gives) and the “M narrative” (the 
account of Zimmerman’s critics).93 Ultimately, it is well beyond 
the scope of this note to determine which narrative most 
accurately describes that night’s events.94 For illustrative 
purposes, however, this note will assume that the “Z narrative” 
is true and take the statements George Zimmerman made as an 
accurate account of that evening’s events. This assumption, 
which should not be read to imply that the author knows or 
believes this version of events to be true, is based on the fact 
that Zimmerman’s narrative most effectively highlights the 
central issue of this note: whether individuals can intentionally 
insert themselves into situations where violence is a reasonably 
foreseeable outcome and still maintain a claim of self-defense.  
Zimmerman acted as a member of his community’s 
neighborhood watch group.95 He lived in the Retreat at Twin 
Lakes, a gated community in Sanford, Florida.96 According to 
Zimmerman’s conversation with a 911 operator on the night of 
the incident, there had been some break-ins in the 
  
“how normal psychological processes that operate below the level of conscious 
awareness can lead to systematic errors in judgments of criminality.” Id. at 295. As 
they explain, “[w]hen the person being judged fits a criminal stereotype, the suspicion 
heuristic can cause the actor more easily to believe honestly—but mistakenly—that the 
person poses a threat and that deadly force is necessary and appropriate to repel it.” 
Id. at 314-15. Thus, stereotypes regarding Martin’s race, age, and attire “could have 
affected [Zimmerman’s] judgment that Martin posed a threat” even if Zimmerman did 
not harbor overtly racist beliefs. Id. at 317. 
 93 David Kopel, Florida’s Self Defense Laws, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 
27, 2012, 11:59 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/03/27/floridas-self-defense-laws/. 
Kopel notes in his post that the debate over Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” is 
ultimately misguided as it does not come into play in either narrative. In the “Z 
narrative” Zimmerman did not have the opportunity to retreat in complete safety, 
rendering whether he could stand his ground moot. Under the “M narrative” 
Zimmerman committed criminal homicide and wouldn’t be able to claim self-defense 
anyway. In neither narrative is the actual “Stand Your Ground” law implicated. Id. 
 94 Id. Given that a jury ultimately acquitted Zimmerman of second-degree 
murder and manslaughter, there is some basis to conclude that his version of events is 
at least plausible, regardless of whether it is true in every respect. See Lizette Alvarez 
& Cara Buckley, Zimmerman is Acquitted in Killing of Trayvon Martin, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/us/george-zimmerman-verdict-
trayvon-martin.html (“In finding him not guilty of murder or manslaughter, the jury 
agreed that Mr. Zimmerman could have been justified in shooting Mr. Martin because 
he feared great bodily harm or death.”). 
 95 Campbell Robertson & John Schwartz, Shooting Focuses Attention on a 
Program That Seeks to Avoid Guns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/03/23/us/trayvon-martin-death-spotlights-neighborhood-watch-groups.html. 
 96 Prieto, supra note 8.  
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neighborhood recently.97 Zimmerman called the police on the 
evening of February 26, 2012, because he said he saw a 
suspicious-looking teenager while driving to the grocery store.98 
He told the 911 operator that he saw a “guy [who] looks like 
he’s up to no good, or he’s on drugs or something. It’s raining 
and he’s just walking around, looking about.”99 While giving the 
operator directions to his location, Zimmerman saw the 
“suspicious guy” start running.100 Zimmerman exited his car 
and followed, until being told by the operator that “we don’t 
need you to do that.”101 Zimmerman said that as he returned to 
his car, Martin jumped out from the bushes and said, “[W]hat 
the f**k is your problem homie?”102 Zimmerman said that 
Martin then punched him in the face, causing him to fall to the 
ground.103 Zimmerman described how the attack continued: 
He was wailing on my head. When I started yelling for help, he 
grabbed my head and started hitting my head. I tried to sit up and 
yell for help and he grabbed my head and started hitting it into the 
sidewalk. When he started doing that I slid into the grass so he’d 
stop hitting my head and I was still yelling for help. And I could see 
people looking and some guy yells out “I’m calling 911” and I said 
“help me, help me, he’s killing me.”104 
Zimmerman said that Martin covered his nose and 
mouth and told him, “You’re going to die tonight.”105 Zimmerman 
carried a gun that evening and said he thought Martin was 
reaching for it.106 Before Martin could reach the gun, Zimmerman 
pulled it out and shot Martin.107  
Martin died from the wound.108 Zimmerman later said of 
Martin, “I did not want to confront him.”109 On July 13, 2013, a jury 
of six women acquitted Zimmerman of the second-degree murder 
and manslaughter charges that had been brought against him.110 
  
 97 Transcript of George Zimmerman’s Call to the Police, MOTHER JONES, 
available at http://www.motherjones.com/documents/326700-full-transcript-zimmerman 
(last visited May 21, 2013) [hereinafter Zimmerman Transcript].  
 98 New Video, supra note 13.  
 99 Zimmerman Transcript, supra note 97. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 New Video, supra note 13. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Alvarez & Williams, supra note 6. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Alvarez & Buckley, supra note 94.  
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2. Phoenix Jones 
Phoenix Jones is the alter ego of Benjamin Fodor, a 
“self-style[d] superhero” in Seattle.111 Jones wears a superhero 
costume and patrols the city streets seeking to stop crime.112 As 
Jones describes himself, “I am just like everybody else. The 
only difference is that I try to stop crime in my neighborhood 
and everywhere else.”113  
Jones does not stop crime by himself. He is a member of 
the “Rain City Superhero Movement.”114 At least eight other 
“superheroes” are also members of the group.115 Jones says that 
everyone on his team has either a military or mixed martial 
arts background.116 In addition, the Rain City Superheroes carry 
“[t]asers, nightsticks, [and] pepper spray, but no firearms.”117 
Jones also carries a net gun and a grappling hook.118 Freelance 
filmmaker and photographer Ryan McNamee frequently patrols 
along with the group and records their actions.119 
Numerous videos of Jones in action are available 
online.120 In one video, Jones runs toward a group of people he 
believes to be fighting on a street.121 Jones scatters the group, 
yelling, “Break it up!”122 Shortly thereafter, some of the women 
in the group turn on Jones, and he has to avoid being hit by 
them.123 In another video, Jones and other Rain City 
Superheroes are “on patrol” when they witness a fight outside a 
  
 111 Jonathan Martin, Phoenix Jones Appears in Court; Vows to Keep Fighting 
Crime, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 13, 2011, 9:19 AM), http://seattletimes.com/html/theblotter/ 
2016492053_phoenix_jones_appears_in_court.html. 
 112 Hopper & Karlinsky, supra note 15.  
 113 Martin, supra note 111. 
 114 Casey McNerthney, Police Alerted to “Superheroes” Patrolling Seattle, 
SEATTLEPI.COM (Nov. 18, 2010, 10:00 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Police-
alerted-to-superheroes-patrolling-Seattle-821425.php. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Hopper & Karlinsky, supra note 15. 
 119 Ryan McNamee, About Me, RYAN MCNAMEE PRODUCTIONS, 
http://mcnamee.weebly.com/about.html. Jones’s self-promotion has sometimes led to conflict 
with other members of the Real Life Superhero community. See, e.g., Phoenix Jones Sells 
Snake Oil, Calls It a Supersuit, URBAN AVENGER (July 9, 2012, 1:13 AM), 
http://urbanavenger.reallifesuperheroes.org/2012/07/09/phoenix-jones-sells-snake-oil-calls-it-
a-supersuit/ (“The point is to make himself look good. [T]hat’s ALL that matters to him.”).  
 120 See, e.g., Phoenix Jones: First Fight of the New Year, YOUTUBE (Mar. 24, 
2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QFmkyCmyMec; Phoenix Jones Stops Assault, 
VIMEO, http://vimeo.com/30307440; Phoenix Jones: Getting Punched in Belltown, 
YOUTUBE (Mar. 24, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TqFfHDSJ25s.  
 121 Phoenix Jones Stops Assault, supra note 120. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
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bar and pursue the various attackers to help identify them for 
the police.124 In a third video, Jones and a sidekick insert 
themselves into the middle of an altercation in which one man 
is aggressively yelling at and striking another man outside a 
bar.125 But then the aggressor changes his focus and begins 
punching and pushing Jones and his colleague.126 In all three of 
these incidents, Jones or one of his cohorts calls 911 to request 
a police presence at the scene. Jones is not depicted in any of 
the videos initiating physical contact with the individuals. 
Jones’s troubles continued in another incident in which 
he claimed to be breaking up a fight. Despite his altruistic 
motive, police arrested him after members of the group claimed 
that a man in a “Spider-Man costume” attacked them with 
pepper spray.127 Police said that the group was “dancing and 
having a good time” before Jones arrived, while Jones 
maintained that he broke up a violent encounter.128 
The arrest highlights the complicated relationship 
between Jones and the Seattle Police Department. On the one 
hand, several of the online videos show Jones cooperating with 
the police.129 On the other hand, law enforcement officials 
profess skepticism toward Jones’s involvement.130 Seattle City 
Attorney Peter Holmes described Jones as “no hero, just a 
deeply misguided individual.”131 Officers have noted several 
instances in which individuals have accused Jones of pepper 
spraying them during “some type of disturbance.”132  
Prosecutors ultimately decided not to pursue charges 
against Jones after arresting him.133 According to City Attorney 
Holmes, the city prosecutors did not think they could prove 
  
 124 Phoenix Jones: First Fight of the New Year, supra note 120. This activity, 
with the notable difference that Jones and his colleague were wearing superhero 
outfits, is essentially the same activity that George Zimmerman claims he engaged in 
on the night he shot Trayvon Martin. See Alvarez & Williams, supra note 6. In both 
instances, the men claimed that they were helping follow individuals they believed 
were engaged in criminality to help the police locate and apprehend them. See id. 
 125 Phoenix Jones: Getting Punched in Belltown, supra note 120.  
 126 Id. 
 127 McNerthney, supra note 14.  
 128 Id. 
 129 See, e.g., Phoenix Jones: Getting Punched in Belltown, supra note 120; 
Phoenix Jones: First Fight of the New Year, supra note 120. 
 130 Jenny Kuglin, Phoenix Jones: Real Life Superhero, KOMO NEWS (Nov. 19, 
2010), http://capitolhill.komonews.com/content/phoenix-jones-real-life-superhero.  
 131 Martha Kang, No Charges Against Seattle’s Self-Appointed Superhero, 
KOMO NEWS (Nov. 24, 2011), http://downtownseattle.komonews.com/news/people/ 
693190-no-charges-against-seattles-self-appointed-superhero.  
 132 McNerthney, supra note 14. 
 133 Kang, supra note 131.  
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beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones intentionally pepper 
sprayed the entire group, particularly because in the State of 
Washington “a person is allowed to use force when he or she is 
coming to the aid of another person believed to be in danger.”134 
But Holmes drew a sharp distinction between the individuals 
the law is meant to protect and Jones. As he phrased it: “Our 
state’s good Samaritan statutes are designed to protect 
individuals who happen upon—rather than actively seek out—
opportunities to render assistance to others, without expectation 
of compensation. These laws are not designed to protect a 
branded, costumed character, his roving video crew, or their 
copyrighted videos . . . .”135 
Seattle is not alone in its superhero presence. Real life 
“superheroes” have arisen in cities across the country, including 
Washington, D.C., Boston, San Francisco, Milwaukee, and 
Minneapolis.136 As described in the New York Times: 
In a niche of urban life that has evolved in recent years somewhere 
between comic-book fantasy and the Boy Scout oath, a cadre of self-
cast crusaders—some with capes, some without, all with something 
to prove—are on the march. 
. . . Whether they are making the world safer or just weirder remains 
an open question.137 
Whether these “superheroes”—and Jones in particular—
have the right to claim self-defense is also an open question. 
3. Additional Cases 
Difficult questions regarding provocation are not limited 
to dramatic cases like Zimmerman and Jones. Thus, it is also 
worth considering how those questions are addressed in other, 
less high-profile circumstances. 
In Pennsylvania, police charged Spencer Newcomer 
with murder for shooting and killing David Wintermyer after 
  
 134 Id.  
 135 Id. 
 136 Mark Memmott, DC’s Guardian and Phoenix Jones: Real Life Superheroes 
Open Up—A Bit, NPR (Mar. 14, 2011, 3:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2011/03/14/134539750/dcs-guardian-and-phoenix-jones-real-life-super-heroes-
open-up-a-bit; Kirk Johnson, Crusaders Take Page, and Outfits, from Comics, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/ 
26/us/crusaders-take-page-and-outfits-from-comics.html. 
 137 Johnson, supra note 136. 
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the two men argued outside their neighboring homes.138 
Newcomer got in his car to drive away from the altercation, but 
he stopped and approached Wintermyer after he saw Wintermyer 
following him.139 Newcomer claimed he acted in self-defense when 
he shot Wintermyer because he thought he saw Wintermyer 
pulling a weapon out of his pocket.140 But the prosecution 
“contended Newcomer provoked the incident by stopping 
instead of driving away.”141 Further, the prosecution contended 
that Wintermyer never reached for his pocket at all and that 
Newcomer planned to confront Wintermyer that morning.142 
In Massachusetts, Santano Dessin shot a man after an 
argument that prosecutors contended Dessin provoked so that 
he could claim self-defense.143 The prosecutor said that Dessin 
armed himself with a handgun, a knife, and pepper spray 
before aggressively confronting the other man.144 When the 
victim apparently responded in kind, Dessin shot him.145  
In North Carolina, Roy Lowman left his home to 
confront a man who was smashing his car with a metal pipe.146 
The man knew Lowman and his wife and had been a guest in 
their home on the day of the incident, but after he left, he 
started hitting the Lowmans’ car.147 When the man turned on 
Lowman, Lowman’s wife shot him three times.148 The local 
sheriff said that the shots were fired in self-defense.149  
  
 138 Rick Lee, Judge: Spencer Newcomer Can Argue Self-Defense at Murder 
Trial, YORK DAILY REC. (Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.ydr.com/crime/ci_22054704/judge-
spencer-newcomer-can-argue-self-defense-at. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. The object turned out to be a cell phone. Id. 
 141 Id.  
 142 Rick Lee, Springettsbury Homicide: Witness Testifies about the Murder of 
David Wintermyer, YORK DAILY REC. (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.ydr.com/local/ 
ci_22766465/eyewitness-springettsbury-township-murder-testifies-court. 
 143 Jarret Bencks, Prosecutor: Somerville Shooting Set Up to Appear as Self-
Defense, BOSTON.COM (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.boston.com/yourtown/news/somerville/ 
2012/11/prosecutor_somerville_shooting.html. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Jessica Pickens, Sheriff: Man Shot in Self Defense, SHELBY STAR (Nov. 3, 2012, 
7:20 PM), http://www.shelbystar.com/news/sheriff-man-shot-in-self-defense-1.43252. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. Technically, this case would fall into defense of another, rather than 
self-defense because Mrs. Lowman shot to defend her husband rather than herself. The 
distinction is relatively meaningless, however, given that the two doctrines are treated 
essentially identically. See, e.g., 22 C.J.S. CRIMINAL LAW § 60 (2013) (“A person is 
justified in the use of force against an aggressor to the extent it appears and one 
reasonably believes that this conduct is necessary to defend oneself or another against 
the aggressor’s imminent use of unlawful force.”) (emphasis added). 
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B. Case Studies—Application of Frames 
1. Zimmerman and Jones  
a. Any Provocation Application 
Neither George Zimmerman nor Phoenix Jones would 
likely be able to assert self-defense in a jurisdiction applying the 
Any Provocation frame of provocation. The jury instruction in 
Washington, D.C., for example, that “[o]ne who deliberately puts 
himself/herself in a position where s/he has reason to believe that 
his/her presence will provoke trouble cannot claim self-defense”150 is 
applicable to both individuals. They intentionally inserted 
themselves into situations where their presence could reasonably 
have provoked some sort of trouble, barring a claim to self-defense.  
An altercation is a reasonably foreseeable result of 
following a suspicious individual around a neighborhood late at 
night. Certainly, Zimmerman did not do everything in his 
power “to avoid the danger,”151 even crediting his version of that 
night’s events. Avoiding the danger would have required him to 
avoid even the possibility of an encounter with Martin, 
assuming that Martin was, in fact, a suspicious individual. 
Zimmerman’s failure to take reasonable precautions is 
inconsistent with an individual who is not “even slightly at 
fault in creating the difficulty.”152 Zimmerman’s behavior falls 
short of the requirements for claiming self-defense under the 
Any Provocation frame. 
In Jones’s case, his disregard of the potential for conflict 
is particularly stark. The reasonable possibility of violence 
inherent in Jones’s encounters has been repeatedly 
demonstrated.153 Yet, rather than do “everything in his 
power . . . to avoid the danger,”154 Jones continues to thrust 
himself directly into dangerous situations. In doing so, Jones 
forfeits his right to claim he acted in self-defense under the 
Any Provocation frame.  
  
 150 1-IX CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR DC INSTRUCTION § 9.504(a). 
 151 Laney v. United States, 294 F. 412, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 152 Smith v. Commonwealth, 435 S.E.2d 414, 416 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 153 See, e.g., Hopper & Karlinsky, supra note 15; Phoenix Jones: Getting 
Punched in Belltown, supra note 120. 
 154 Laney, 294 F. at 414. 
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A comparison to State v. Slater155 is particularly 
instructive for both individuals. Similar to the defendant in 
Slater, both Zimmerman and Jones approached individuals 
they believed to be engaged in illegality.156 Indeed, Jones seeks 
such encounters.157 Just as the court in Slater found that the 
defendant’s behavior in approaching a criminal activity was 
“reasonably calculated to produce the occasion”158 in which 
violence occurred, so too would a court likely find in the cases 
of Zimmerman and Jones. As such, both would be barred from 
asserting self-defense under the Any Provocation frame. 
b. Straight Provocation Application 
Zimmerman and Jones would likely find more favor in a 
jurisdiction applying Straight Provocation. Under this frame, an 
act “must be willingly and knowingly calculated to lead to conflict” 
before the actor forfeits the right to claim self-defense.159 Mere lack 
of judgment, absent actual misconduct, is not enough.160 If a jury 
believed Zimmerman’s account of the events of that night, he would 
almost certainly be able to claim self-defense. Jones, on the other 
hand, would require a case-by-case inquiry, though he would not be 
categorically barred from asserting self-defense. 
Assuming his version of events to be true, Zimmerman 
would likely succeed in being able to assert a self-defense claim 
under the Straight Provocation frame. It does not matter how 
apparent it may seem in retrospect that following an allegedly 
suspicious character through a neighborhood late at night may 
lead to a violent confrontation. So long as Zimmerman did not 
act with the purpose of bringing about the conflict, he would 
not lose his right to claim self-defense. In fact, in Zimmerman’s 
recounting of the events that night, Martin is the one who 
threw the first punch and initiated the verbal and physical 
altercation.161 Because Zimmerman did not intentionally bring 
on this confrontation, nor initiate the violence in the encounter, 
he did not forfeit his right to assert a self-defense claim in a 
jurisdiction applying the Straight Provocation frame.  
  
 155 State v. Slater, 644 S.E.2d 50 (S.C. 2007). See supra note 37-43 and 
accompanying text. 
 156 See Robertson & Schwartz, supra note 95; supra note 120. 
 157 See supra note 114. 
 158 Slater, 644 S.E.2d at 52 (quoting State v. Bryant, 520 S.E.2d 319, 322 
(S.C. 1999)). 
 159 State v. Jackson, 382 P.2d 229, 232 (Ariz. 1963). 
 160 Id. 
 161 New Video, supra note 13. 
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Jones is not categorically precluded from claiming self-
defense under the Straight Provocation frame. Jones certainly 
runs afoul of the admonition from the Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals that the right to claim self-defense “only extends to one 
who was not in any sense seeking an encounter.”162 Yet, while 
Jones does appear to seek out encounters, that does not 
necessarily mean that he engaged in misconduct, as required 
under this frame.163 The key inquiry for a court is whether Jones 
acted as the aggressor in a given encounter.164 A jury would have 
to make these factual determinations on a case-by-case basis. 
Thus, Jones would have the right to claim self-defense where he 
interposes himself between individuals who were already 
fighting when one or both of those individuals turn their 
aggression on him.165 He would not, however, have the right to 
claim self-defense where he is the aggressor.166  
c. Provocation with Intent 
In jurisdictions applying the Provocation with Intent 
frame, it is almost certain that courts would allow both 
Zimmerman and Jones to assert self-defense. There is simply 
nothing that could be gleaned from either of their actions to 
indicate that they acted “with the purpose of causing death or 
serious physical injury”167 by engaging in provocative behavior.  
A telling comparison is reached by looking at the 
Pennsylvania case Commonwealth v. Samuel.168 There, the 
defendant engaged in provocative activity by placing a loaded 
weapon on the table as a strong inducement for the victim to 
leave the apartment.169 Despite being provocative, the 
defendant did not lose his right to claim he acted in self-
defense because the action did not manifest the intent to cause 
  
 162 Marquardt v. State, 882 A.2d 900, 927 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005). 
 163 Jackson, 382 P.2d at 232. The misconduct in Marquardt arose from the 
defendant illegally breaking into the victim’s home. Marquardt, 882 A.2d at 909-10. 
 164 See 1-8 MODERN FED. JURY INSTRUCTIONS – CRIMINAL § 8.08. 
 165 See, e.g., Hopper & Karlinsky, supra note 15; Phoenix Jones: Getting 
Punched in Belltown, supra note 120. 
 166 See McNerthney, supra note 14; see also supra note 164. The Jones case 
highlights the difficulties of determining the aggressor in a given incident. Jones 
claimed that he broke up an already-violent encounter. Id. Members of the group on 
the street, however, claimed that they were merely “dancing and having a good time.” 
Id. That the state ultimately decided not to press charges indicates the complexity of 
making factual determinations in these types of situations. 
 167 DEL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL § 5.14. 
 168 590 A.2d 1245 (Pa. 1991). See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text. 
 169 Id. at 1248. 
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death or serious bodily injury.170 For Zimmerman, even if a 
court were to find that he acted provocatively by following Martin 
while carrying a gun, there is no indication, at least in 
Zimmerman’s version of events, that he acted with the intent to 
harm Martin before the altercation began.171 Absent the element 
of intent, it does not matter how provocative Zimmerman’s 
behavior was or how reasonably likely it was to lead to a violent 
confrontation. He could still assert a self-defense claim, which a 
jury could decide to credit or not.  
Jones’s appearance in the midst of a fraught encounter 
in full superhero regalia, while likely to be provocative as the 
word is commonly understood, is not provocation according to 
the courts applying this frame.172 If such inherently threatening 
behavior as displaying a firearm does not count as 
provocation,173 then wearing a superhero mask surely would not 
qualify. Given the breadth of provocative behavior that is allowed 
without constituting provocation for the purposes of asserting a 
self-defense claim under Provocation with Intent, it seems likely 
that Zimmerman and Jones would be permitted to assert a claim 
of self-defense in a jurisdiction applying that frame. 
2. Additional Cases 
a. Any Provocation Application 
The Any Provocation frame is so narrow that it will 
preclude a defendant from claiming self-defense in most 
questionable cases. For instance, Spencer Newcomer—who got 
out of his car and shot a man who had been following him after 
their earlier argument174—would not be found “without fault in 
provoking or bringing on” the altercation.175 Regardless of 
whether the victim was actually pulling out a weapon when 
Newcomer shot him, Newcomer could not assert self-defense 
after putting himself “in a position where [he had] reason to 
believe that [his] presence will provoke trouble.”176 Newcomer 
stopped the car and went to confront the victim with whom he 
  
 170 Id. 
 171 See supra notes 91-109 and accompanying text. 
 172 See supra notes 71-90 and accompanying text. 
 173 See Commonwealth v. Samuel, 590 A.2d 1245 (Pa. 1991). 
 174 Lee, supra note 138. 
 175 2-52 VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL INSTRUCTION 52.500. 
 176 1-IX CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR DC INSTRUCTION § 9.504(a). 
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quarreled earlier.177 Clearly, this is a position that would give a 
person reason to believe that trouble would ensue. Further, 
Newcomer did not do “everything in his power, consistent with 
his safety, to avoid the danger”178 given that he could have 
simply continued driving rather than stopping his car and 
confronting Wintermyer. 
A nearly identical analysis applies to Roy Lowman, who 
left his home to confront a man smashing his car with a metal 
pipe.179 This was a circumstance where trouble was reasonably 
foreseeable. Lowman, therefore, would likely be precluded from 
claiming self-defense in a jurisdiction applying the Any 
Provocation frame when trouble did result. 
Santano Dessin, likewise, could not assert self-defense 
in a jurisdiction applying the Any Provocation frame after he 
allegedly armed himself and sought to confront his victim with 
the intention of being able to shoot him.180 Even if Dessin was 
not the first to turn the incident violent, his initiation of a 
verbal confrontation can be enough to preclude a self-defense 
claim under this frame.181 
None of the individuals here would likely succeed in 
being able to assert self-defense in an Any Provocation 
jurisdiction. This highlights the wide breadth of provocation in 
jurisdictions applying this frame. 
b. Straight Provocation 
A determination of whether an individual can assert 
self-defense under the Straight Provocation frame turns on 
finer-grained facts than a determination under the Any 
Provocation frame. In the case of Newcomer, the determination 
would hinge on how he behaved after getting out of his car. If 
he acted as the aggressor in confronting Wintermyer, he would 
not be able to claim self-defense. But if Wintermyer acted as 
the aggressor, Newcomer’s right to assert self-defense would 
remain intact.182  
  
 177 Lee, supra note 138. 
 178 Laney v. United States, 294 F. 412, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 179 Pickens, supra note 21. 
 180 Bencks, supra note 143. 
 181 See Scott v. Commonwealth, 129 S.E. 360, 361-62 (Va. 1925). 
 182 Of course, “aggressor” and “aggressive” are malleable words that fail to 
provide clear guidance. The inherent problem of applying this standard to facts such as 
this is discussed more fully infra in Part III.A.2. 
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Based on the reported facts in Lowman’s case, Mrs. 
Lowman likely would be able to assert a valid defense of others 
claim in a Straight Provocation jurisdiction. While her husband 
went out to confront the victim, it does not appear that Mr. 
Lowman started the actual altercation. Rather, the victim 
attacked Mr. Lowman with the pipe. While Lowman may have 
put himself in harm’s way by leaving his home, he did not 
become the aggressor by doing so. Thus, a court would not deny 
Lowman’s right to claim self-defense.  
On the other hand, Dessin would likely be precluded from 
asserting self-defense in a Straight Provocation jurisdiction. The 
events reported by the prosecutor indicate that Dessin was the 
instigator and aggressor of the altercation. Thus, he would be 
squarely prohibited from asserting self-defense under the 
Straight Provocation frame.  
c. Provocation with Intent 
Newcomer may or may not fall into this frame 
depending on whether the jury believed his account or the 
picture painted by prosecutors that he had planned the 
confrontation.183 Like Dessin, if Newcomer set out that day with 
the purpose of starting a confrontation meant to harm his 
victim, he would be precluded from claiming self-defense under 
the Provocation with Intent frame. 
Lowman would likely not be precluded from asserting 
self-defense under the Provocation with Intent frame, at least 
as the facts in the case are known. There is no indication that 
he acted with the purpose of provoking a conflict so that he and 
his wife could inflict “death or serious physical injury” on the 
victim.184 Additional facts could lead to a reassessment of that 
conclusion, but absent such facts, Lowman would not be barred 
from claiming self-defense under this frame.  
Dessin, meanwhile, would provide a textbook case of an 
individual precluded from asserting self-defense in a 
Provocation with Intent jurisdiction.185 According to the 
prosecutor, Dessin provoked the altercation with the victim 
with the intent to “give him an opportunity to shoot [the 
  
 183 See Lee, supra note 142. 
 184 DEL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL § 5.14. 
 185 That Dessin also could not claim self-defense in a Straignt Provocation 
jurisdiction once again illustrates the non-exclusivity of the different frames. See supra note 79. 
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victim].”186 This would present a clear case of Provocation with 
Intent, and Dessin would consequently be unable to assert a 
claim of self-defense.  
III. A NEW STANDARD: REASONABLE PROVOCATION 
Having examined the major frames of provocation in 
self-defense cases and their application to particular facts, this 
note now proposes a new standard for determining whether an 
individual may claim to have acted in self-defense without 
having provoked the incident: reasonableness. This new 
standard will address the shortcomings of the other approaches 
and provide a workable, consistent frame for determining 
provocation in self-defense cases. 
As discussed below, each of the existing frames for 
analyzing provocation holds some flaw in its application. Thus, 
a new rule is needed to best articulate and promote society’s 
“collective sense of justice.”187 The challenge in crafting such a 
rule is to find the appropriate balance between the vigilant and 
the vigilante. The answer lies in reasonableness. By focusing 
the relevant inquiry less on who contributed to the altercation, 
the meaning of provocation, or the intent of various actors, the 
courts will be able to better achieve results consistent with 
society’s notions of justice. 
A. Weaknesses in the Frameworks 
In addition to the problematic inconsistencies between 
the frames discussed above, each frame falls short of providing 
an optimal rule for determining questions of provocation in 
self-defense cases. As such, they fail to achieve the goals of the 
criminal law in general: “to create the set of rules that best 
implements our collective sense of justice.”188 Thus, in crafting a 
rule to govern claims of self-defense, the focus should be both 
on achieving justice in the actual case as well as incentivizing 
behavior that society wishes to promote. In delineating the 
boundaries of self-defense, this means crafting a rule to 
encourage intervention in the killing of Kitty Genovese,189 while 
  
 186 Bencks, supra note 143. 
 187 Robinson, supra note 5, at 1. 
 188 Id. 
 189 “In 1964, a young woman named Kitty Genovese was murdered in Queens, 
NY by repeated stabbings over a period of 30 minutes while 38 witnesses watched from 
their buildings—none of whom called the police.” Carolyn D. Amadon, Thoughts from 
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also discouraging someone from enacting a Death Wish 
scenario.190 For the reasons discussed below, each of the current 
frames falls short of meeting this ideal.  
1. Any Provocation 
The primary flaw with the Any Provocation frame is 
that it shifts too much of the burden of good behavior onto the 
actor claiming to have acted in self-defense. Not only must 
actors show that they did not provoke the incident within the 
plain meaning of the word, they must also show that they are 
“without fault in bringing on the difficulty.”191 Looking solely at 
that language, and absent any limiting instructions on what it 
means to be without fault, that frame could encompass 
behavior as innocent as painting one’s house a color that one 
has reason to know will upset his neighbor.192 While there do 
not seem to be any cases of such innocent behavior precluding 
the right to claim self-defense, the jury instructions in 
Washington, D.C. would preclude a self-defense claim even 
where one does nothing more than enter into a situation 
wherein he has reason to believe that trouble will result.193 This 
essentially would allow the most aggressive members of society 
to prevent others from engaging in what would otherwise be 
lawful and protected conduct.194 Certainly, it is not within our 
“collective sense of justice”195 to allow the aggressive and violent 
to determine the conduct of everyone else. To do so would be to 
undermine the very principles underlying our system of laws. 
Because the Any Provocation frame comes too close to the line 
of allowing the most irrational or threatening individuals to 
  
the Chair: No Excuses, CBA REC., Oct. 2005, at 52. “The witnesses, who watched a man 
attack and kill Kitty Genovese from their windows, stated they feared potential 
criminal liability if a court later determined that they wrongfully interfered by coming 
to her aid.” Alicia M. Duff, Rhode Island Adopts Model Penal Code Standard for the 
Use of Force for the Protection of Others—State v. Beeley, 653 A.2d 722 (R.I. 1995), 30 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 551, 553 n.16 (1997). 
 190 “Five [Death Wish] films were produced between 1974 and 1994. All of 
them starred Charles Bronson as Paul Kersey, a previously pacifistic architect-turned-
vigilante due to the death of his wife at the hands of criminals.” Robert J. Cottrol, 
Submission Is Not the Answer: Lethal Violence, Microcultures of Criminal Violence and 
the Right to Self-Defense, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1029, 1030 n.3 (1998). 
 191 S.C. REQUESTS TO CHARGE – CRIMINAL § 6-6. 
 192 Robinson, supra note 5, at 5-6. 
 193 1-IX CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR DC INSTRUCTION § 9.504(a). 
 194 See Raymond, supra note 3, at 338. 
 195 Robinson, supra note 5, at 1. 
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determine the behavior of all others, it cannot be accepted as a 
workable principle as it is currently formulated. 
2. Straight Provocation 
The Straight Provocation frame exists as a kind of 
middle ground between the extremes of the Any Provocation 
and Provocation with Intent frames. It comes the closest to 
exemplifying the plain meaning of provocation because that 
meaning is exactly the standard that the frame uses. One who 
provokes an incident cannot claim self-defense.196 While the 
frame is admirably straightforward, its application lacks 
clarity absent some explanatory gloss. Certainly there are 
obvious cases where the defendant would not have the right to 
assert self-defense—for example, where the defendant fires the 
first shot197 or breaks into the victim’s home.198 But there is a 
vast middle ground of behavior that is not so clearly delineated. 
What about the use of insulting language?199 What about 
brandishing a firearm without making an overt threat?200 This 
is to say nothing of the potentially provocative behavior of 
George Zimmerman or Phoenix Jones. In these gray areas, the 
mere word “provocation” offers little guidance. While the 
Straight Provocation frame comes closest to offering a 
Goldilocks “just right” solution to the self-defense framing 
question, it can only be useful and beneficial in application 
when it is paired with some explanation to further elaborate 
what is meant. Absent that explanation, the frame is too vague 
to serve as an appropriate analytic tool. 
3. Provocation with Intent  
Where the Any Provocation frame overly restricts the 
behavior of an individual seeking to claim self-defense, the 
Provocation with Intent frame allows too much latitude. Under 
this frame, an individual can engage in foreseeably and 
  
 196 See FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION (CRIMINAL) § 3.6(f) (2012), available at 
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/jury_instructions/chapters/chapter3/p1c3s3.6.f.rtf. 
 197 See La Farn v. State, 265 S.W.2d 816, 816-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954). 
 198 See Marquardt v. State, 882 A.2d 900, 908-10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005). 
 199 See Scott v. Commonwealth, 129 S.E. 360, 361-62 (Va. 1925) (applying the 
Any Provocation frame to hold that defendant’s insulting language qualified as 
provocation). 
 200 See Commonwealth v. Samuel, 590 A.2d 1245, 1246-47 (Pa. 1991) 
(applying the Provocation with Intent frame to hold that displaying weapon did not 
qualify as provocation). 
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deliberately provocative behavior so long as it is not with the 
“conscious object to cause death or serious bodily injury to the 
alleged victim.”201 As discussed above, under this frame, it is 
possible for an individual to throw the first punch in a fight 
and then still claim self-defense when the victim responds 
violently. This frame defies the plain meaning of the word 
“provocation” and allows behavior fundamentally at odds with 
society’s notions of justice: namely, that a person can start a 
fight and then claim legal protection when the other party 
fights back.202 This sort of behavior is exactly the conduct that 
the provocation doctrine is designed to prevent. This frame’s 
failure to prevent that conduct places its flaws in sharp relief. 
B. Reasonable Provocation 
To correct for the problems inherent in the existing 
frames of provocation, this note contends that states should adopt 
a rule whereby courts consider a two-part inquiry when weighing 
whether a defendant is precluded from claiming self-defense: 
(1) Were the defendant’s allegedly provocative actions 
objectively reasonable? 
(2) Was the risk of violence that the defendant incurred 
reasonable in light of the totality of circumstances? 
Focusing on the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
actions and asking whether the defendant has engaged in 
unjustifiably risky behavior ensures that determinations 
regarding self-defense and provocation closely conform to 
society’s sense of justice. That sense would become the 
determinative inquiry. This ensures that legal judgments 
surrounding provocation in self-defense cases abide by societal 
norms for context-specific situations rather than the variable 
judicially-imposed frames discussed above. Indeed, reasonableness 
is a “device for delivering to the jury, in its role as conscience of the 
  
 201 PA. SUGGESTED STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIM.) § 9.501 (2012). 
 202 Much of the criticism of the verdict in the Zimmerman case seems to stem 
from the belief that Zimmerman initiated the confrontation with Martin but did not 
suffer any legal consequence as a result. See e.g., Amy Dardashtian, Zimmerman 
Verdict Exposes Deficiencies in U.S. Self-Defense Law, HUFFINGTON POST (July 14, 
2013, 2:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amy-dardashtian/zimmerman-trial-
self-defense-law_b_3594741.html (“Those who believe Zimmerman should have been 
found guilty, overwhelmingly point to the fact that he was the aggressor.”). 
Dardashtian argues that the law in this area of self-defense is improperly divorced 
from morality because it allows the instigator in certain altercations to avoid 
punishment. Id. 
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community, the normative or value judgment as to the degree of 
moral culpability to be assigned to the particular offender.”203 
The first prong of the test focuses on the specific actions 
of the defendant to determine whether the individual acted in 
an objectively reasonable manner. In other words, did the 
individual act as “a reasonable person of ordinary prudence 
would have done in the same or similar circumstances”?204 It 
does not make sense, nor does it comport with conceptions of 
justice, to entitle an individual acting unreasonably in 
provoking an encounter to then claim immunity from 
prosecution. Likewise, it does not follow that someone who does 
act reasonably should be precluded from claiming self-defense 
because of the unreasonable actions of others. 
Framing the issue as one of reasonableness inherently 
strikes a balance between these two poles and ensures that 
only those individuals conforming to baseline societal norms 
can claim legal justification when they commit what would 
otherwise be a crime. Thus, because he was not acting 
reasonably, the vigilante killer of Death Wish205 who actively 
pursues criminals to seek revenge would be precluded, as a 
threshold matter, from claiming self-defense in any situation 
where those criminals turned on him. Society has no interest in 
protecting the vigilante. The initial shooters in La Farn206 and 
White207 would be similarly barred. In contrast, the provocative 
house painter of Professor Robinson’s hypothetical208 would not 
be precluded from claiming self-defense absent some 
extraordinary set of circumstances. 
The first prong of the test looks entirely at the facial 
reasonableness of the allegedly provocative actions. It calls for 
a very tight focus on whether the “provocative” action itself—be 
it following a suspicious character at night or jumping between 
two men about to fight—is, on its face, reasonable. This prong 
  
 203 Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical 
Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and 
Provocation Cases, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 16 (1998) (quoting Dolores A. Donovan & 
Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete: A Critical Perspective on Self-
Defense and Provocation, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 444-46 (1981)). 
 204 57A AM. JUR. 2d NEGLIGENCE § 133 (discussing the reasonable person 
standard in the context of negligence). 
 205 See supra note 190. 
 206 La Farn v. State, 265 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954); see 
discussion supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. 
 207 White v. State, No. 329, 2008 WL 4107980, at *1 (Del. Sept. 5, 2008); see 
discussion supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. 
 208 See Robinson, supra note 5, at 5-6. 
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calls for looking at the act itself, devoid of context. Actions that 
are objectively reasonable on their face are presumed not to be 
provocation under this frame. Those actions that are not 
reasonable are presumed to be provocation.  
The first prong, however, is not necessarily dispositive. 
Rather, it creates a rebuttable presumption that is then 
analyzed under the second prong. This two-step process is 
necessary because in some instances it may be desirable to 
endorse and encourage behavior that is facially unreasonable. 
Likewise, actions that seem reasonable out of context may be 
unreasonable when considering them in their full context. 
Thus, under the second prong of the test, a jury would consider 
the totality of circumstances in which the defendant acted. This 
triggers a balancing test. If the jury finds that a facially 
unreasonable action was the preferred course of conduct in 
light of the totality of circumstances, the action would not be 
considered provocation. Similarly, a facially reasonable action 
can be deemed provocation if the broader context suggests 
unreasonableness, though this may be a more difficult 
threshold to overcome. In either instance, the facial 
reasonableness of the actions creates a presumption that can 
be confirmed or rebutted in light of the totality of 
circumstances. A defendant able to comply with these two 
prongs would be entitled to claim self-defense. 
The Kitty Genovese case209 provides a clear example of 
the role the second prong plays in the proposed test. While it 
may generally appear unreasonable to insert oneself into a 
situation where a deranged man is repeatedly stabbing a 
woman on the street, it would be even worse to consciously 
ignore the murder. In that circumstance, a facially 
unreasonable action—confronting a disturbed man wielding a 
knife—is the proper and socially desirable course of conduct, 
and the would-be Samaritan runs a risk of violence that is 
more than justified by the apparent harm that will result from 
a lack of intervention. 210 Any legal rule that did not account for 
  
 209 See Amadon, supra note 189.  
 210 The Kitty Genovese example may be slightly misleading here because 
many jurisdictions recognize defense of others alongside self-defense as a justification 
for otherwise criminal behavior. See, e.g., 22 C.J.S. CRIMINAL LAW § 60 (2012) (“A 
person is justified in the use of force against an aggressor to the extent it appears and 
one reasonably believes that this conduct is necessary to defend oneself or another 
against the aggressor’s imminent use of unlawful force.” (emphasis added)). Thus, a 
case like Kitty Genovese is already covered by existing law. What is not addressed is a 
situation where an individual intervenes for the good of the general community but 
cannot point to a specific individual in need of the intervention. The actions of 
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such behavior would not be in accord with the conceptions of 
justice that the criminal law is designed to preserve. The 
criminal law ought to protect the vigilant community member 
who aids his community and fellow community members.  
While it does not appear that any jurisdiction has yet 
introduced reasonableness as the central inquiry for 
determining a question of provocation, reasonableness is deeply 
intertwined with many other aspects of a self-defense claim. 
For instance, in New York, where a defendant claims to have 
acted in self-defense, the jury must determine whether “he 
believed deadly force was necessary to avert the imminent use 
of deadly force” and also “whether these beliefs were 
reasonable.”211 Similarly, in the Sixth Circuit, a defendant 
acting in self-defense may use “only as much force as 
reasonably appears to be necessary under the circumstances.”212 
In some states, a defendant who acted “reasonably in self-
defense is generally insulated from criminal liability even if the 
person injured is an innocent bystander.”213 In short, 
determining questions of reasonableness with regard to 
provocation would be consistent with the decisions juries 
already make when deciding other matters of self-defense. 
Indeed, the general principles of self-defense in the common 
law are tightly bound to questions of reasonableness.214 The 
introduction of another reasonableness inquiry would not 
overly complicate the analysis that juries already undertake 
whenever they are confronted with a case of self-defense. 
While reasonableness inquiries are prevalent in self-
defense cases, such inquiries are not universally acclaimed, 
particularly as they relate to race and the law. As Cynthia Lee 
writes, “racial stereotypes[] may influence our assessment of 
whether the defendant’s use of force against the victim was 
reasonable.”215 Professor Lee and others point to the Bernhard 
  
neighborhood watch members and other similarly situated individuals would fall into 
this latter category of those who deserve protection but are not squarely covered by 
existing law. 
 211 People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 52 (N.Y. 1986). 
 212 DIST. JUDGES ASS’N 6TH CIR., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
§ 6.06 (June 10, 2011), available at http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/crim_ 
jury_insts/pdf/12_Chapter_6.pdf. 
 213 See 2 CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 38:7 (2012). 
 214 See, e.g., Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1232 (Conn. 1995) (“The 
common law principle permitting one to use deadly force in self-defense has long been 
restricted by the general rule of reason.”). 
 215 Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative 
Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 401 (1996). 
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Goetz case, where the jury acquitted Goetz, who is white, for 
shooting four black teens on a New York subway where Goetz 
claimed he acted in self-defense.216 To combat this implicit racial 
bias, “Lee has suggested that jurors determining reasonableness 
claims in self-defense and provocation cases should be instructed 
to conduct switching exercises,” in which they see whether they 
would reach the same result if the races of the different parties 
involved were switched.217 Yet, although juries’ determinations 
of reasonableness are often criticized, even critics contend that 
a reasonableness inquiry is better than most of the 
alternatives.218 In other words, while the application of a 
reasonableness standard is subject to question, the standard 
itself remains sound. 
Fundamentally, when properly applied, reasonableness 
as the baseline inquiry on provocation dovetails closely with 
the goal that a jury’s determinations should implement 
society’s “collective sense of justice.”219 The very nature of the 
reasonableness inquiry is that it seeks to determine whether 
an individual’s conduct falls within the realm of socially 
acceptable and societally expected behavior. Behavior that falls 
outside of the sphere of reasonableness exposes the actor to 
criminal or civil liability, or both.220 It is entirely appropriate 
that a jury seeking to determine whether to extend the 
protection of the criminal law to a defendant should make the 
same determination in self-defense cases where there is an 
issue of provocation. 
IV. APPLICATION OF REASONABLE PROVOCATION 
To more fully develop and explain the use of a 
reasonableness standard for determining questions of 
provocation in self-defense cases, it will be helpful to examine how 
the proposed rule will apply in real-world situations and how it 
will interact with the existing frames of provocation. Such 
determinations necessarily require highly fact-specific inquiries 
that are best undertaken through the judicial process. This note 
does not seek to answer the question of whether a jury would find 
  
 216 Id. at 420-21 (“Yet, whether the jurors were conscious of it or not, race 
probably influenced the jury’s perception of whether Goetz acted reasonably.”).  
 217 Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutors and Peremptories, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 
1484 (2012). 
 218 See Lee, supra note 215, at 374. 
 219 Robinson, supra note 5, at 1. 
 220 See, e.g., People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 52 (N.Y. 1986). 
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the specific actions discussed below reasonable. Rather, it seeks to 
highlight some of the key factors that a jury should take into 
account when making a reasonableness determination. 
A. George Zimmerman 
George Zimmerman’s behavior on the night he shot 
Trayvon Martin provides an initial test case for the standard of 
reasonableness in self-defense provocation questions. Was 
Zimmerman a vigilante or merely being vigilant? As discussed 
above, Zimmerman, according to his own account of the events, 
would likely not be able to claim self-defense under the Any 
Provocation frame, but likely could claim self-defense under the 
Straight Provocation or Provocation with Intent frames.221 This 
divergence can be reconciled with a focus on reasonableness. 
Under the Reasonable Provocation frame, the initial 
inquiry in Zimmerman’s case under the proposed standard is 
whether he behaved reasonably in following a suspicious 
individual through his neighborhood because he thought the 
individual might be preparing to commit a crime.222 While this 
is perhaps not behavior in which the average person would 
engage, a jury would not necessarily find that the behavior rose 
to the level of unreasonableness. Indeed, Zimmerman would 
argue that he fulfilled the role of a neighborhood watch 
member. That he was more aggressive in that role than others 
may not automatically elevate his conduct to the level of 
unreasonableness. When weighing the reasonableness of 
Zimmerman’s actions, a jury would likely take note that, 
according to Zimmerman, when the 911 operator told him that 
he did not have to follow Martin, he ceased to do so and began 
walking back to his car.223 Following the instructions of the 911 
operator would likely be seen as increasing the reasonableness 
of Zimmerman’s actions. Zimmerman broke no laws, however, 
and a jury could find that he intended to perform a useful task 
for law enforcement officers.  
Conversely, that Zimmerman carried a gun would likely 
undermine the overall reasonableness of his actions in the eyes 
  
 221 See supra Part II.B.1. 
 222 Although the initial inquiry would have to be into the facts of the events 
that night, this note assumes that Zimmerman’s account of events is true. Therefore 
the inquiry for our purposes begins with a determination of facial reasonableness. 
 223 New Video, supra note 13.  
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of a jury.224 But that alone does not require that Zimmerman’s 
actions, given the totality of circumstances, be deemed 
unreasonable. This is particularly true given that the question 
here focuses on whether the behavior leading to and possibly 
provoking the encounter was reasonable. Zimmerman’s 
decision to carry a firearm did not directly lead to the 
altercation, because there is no indication in Zimmerman’s 
recounting of events that Martin even knew Zimmerman was 
carrying a gun before the fight started.225 The discovery of the 
gun after the altercation began cannot be thought to have 
provoked that very altercation. A jury would have to decide 
whether the act of carrying a loaded gun that night meant that 
Zimmerman acted in a facially unreasonable manner. 
Even if Zimmerman’s actions were facially unreasonable 
that night, the fact finder’s inquiry is not at an end. Instead, 
the jury would have to determine whether the risk of violence 
that the defendant ran was reasonable in light of the totality of 
circumstances. The issue then becomes a balancing test. On the 
one hand is the foreseeable possibility of a violent 
confrontation. On the other hand is the possible benefit of 
locating and identifying a suspected burglar for the police. In 
addition, there is the general deterrent effect of an engaged 
and vigilant community.226 In light of these options, a jury 
would need to determine whether the possible benefit of 
Zimmerman’s actions outweighed the possible harms. Only if 
the jury found Zimmerman’s actions reasonable in light of the 
totality of circumstances would his self-defense claim succeed. 
B. Phoenix Jones 
A more difficult analysis is required in the case of 
Phoenix Jones—the Seattle “superhero.” On their face, Jones’s 
actions in wearing a mask while actively seeking out crime to 
fight seem likely to be found unreasonable under the proposed 
  
 224 Robertson & Schwartz, supra note 95 (“Using a gun in the neighborhood 
watch role would be out of the question, [Sanford Police Department Volunteer 
Coordinator Wendy Dorival] said in an interview.”). 
 225 Alvarez & Williams, supra note 6 (“Mr. Zimmerman was firm in his central self-
defense claim: He did not show his gun before the fight and he did not provoke Mr. Martin.”). 
 226 This is the general motivation behind such policing philosophies as the 
“Broken Windows” theory. Maria Cruz Melendez, Moving to Opportunity & Mending 
Broken Windows, 32 J. LEGIS. 238, 239 (2006) (“The Broken Windows theory suggests 
that unchecked physical and social disorder within neighborhoods may lead to serious 
crime within the neighborhood. Conversely, decreasing disorder within a neighborhood 
may lead to a decrease in serious crimes.”). 
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Reasonable Provocation frame. His actions smack of the 
vigilantism that society refuses to protect as legitimate 
behavior.227 While he may not fit the traditional vigilante mold 
of one seeking to avenge crimes where traditional law 
enforcement has failed, Jones walks perilously close to that 
line. The line becomes even fuzzier when considering that Jones 
carries weapons with him—though not firearms—while 
intentionally seeking out situations replete with the possibility 
of violence. That he wears a mask and styles himself a 
superhero is not dispositive, but it certainly offers strong 
support for the conclusion that Jones does not engage in 
objectively facially reasonable behavior on his nighttime patrols 
of dangerous neighborhoods. For Jones to succeed on the first 
prong of the Reasonable Provocation test, a jury would have to 
find that his superhero persona and behavior were reasonable.  
Despite the unlikeliness of this finding, the inquiry 
would not end there. Even if a jury found that Jones’s 
superhero affectations were unreasonable, he may still fall 
within the realm of self-defense protections. Jones could still 
claim self-defense if the risk of violence in a given situation was 
reasonable in light of the totality of circumstances. This 
analysis boils down to a case-by-case balancing test of the 
interests involved. In each instance, a jury must weigh whether 
the harm that Jones aimed to prevent outweighed any 
unreasonableness of his actions in working to prevent that 
harm. In other words, even if he acted unreasonably, did 
society benefit from Jones’s willingness to do so? This analysis 
may mirror the approach that juries unofficially already take 
when faced with cases of vigilantism. As Professor Hine writes, 
“[T]he law of extra-judicial self-help is effectively split between 
the ‘no justified vigilantism’ stance of the courts and the 
‘justified if reasonable’ stance of the community.”228 This should 
not be read to indicate that the rule proposed in this note is a 
justification for vigilantism. Indeed, the author presumes that 
a jury would find vigilantism in its more virulent forms 
unreasonable. Rather, it indicates that a jury may find a place 
for the sort of soft vigilantism of Phoenix Jones and other “real-
life superheroes” as they patrol and seek to preempt violent 
  
 227 Kelly D. Hine, Vigilantism Revisited: An Economic Analysis of the Law of 
Extra-Judicial Self-Help or Why Can’t Dick Shoot Henry for Stealing Jane’s Truck?, 47 
AM. U. L. REV. 1221, 1227 (1998) (“No state currently recognizes a ‘Justified 
Vigilantism’ or ‘Community Protection’ defense to criminal prosecution.”). 
 228 Id. at 1228. 
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confrontations. The evaluation of costs and benefits in any given 
case would hinge on how unreasonable a jury found a particular 
act balanced against the societal benefits it produced. 
C. Other Cases 
While the determination of reasonableness must 
ultimately be made by a court in full command of the facts, 
under the prosecution’s version of events in the Dessin case,229 it 
is hard to imagine a jury finding Dessin’s actions reasonable. 
According to the prosecutor, Dessin sought out his victim for 
the purpose of provoking a fight that would enable him to shoot 
the victim and claim self-defense.230 It was essentially a 
premeditated attack that—barring exceptional circumstances not 
yet presented—a jury would almost certainly deem unreasonable 
under either prong of the test. The determinations in the 
Newcomer and Lowman cases, however, present more complexity. 
In the case of Newcomer,231 the reasonableness 
determination would depend on the facts that were known or 
believed at the time Newcomer stopped his car to confront 
Wintermyer. How violent was their earlier argument? Is there 
any history of violence between the two? Did Newcomer 
reasonably believe that violence would result if Wintermyer 
continued to follow him? What did Newcomer intend to do when 
he got out of his car? The answer to each of these questions would 
inform a jury on the ultimate reasonableness of Newcomer’s 
actions. It is clear that Newcomer apparently believed that 
Wintermyer carried a weapon with him.232 The fact that 
Newcomer shot him indicates that he perceived Wintermyer to be 
a threat. These facts would cut against the reasonableness of 
confronting Wintermyer. Certainly, confronting an armed and 
threatening individual seems like an unreasonable course of 
action to follow—more so when retreat seemed to be a perfectly 
viable option in the form of simply continuing to drive. Yet 
answering some of the questions above could also inform the 
totality of circumstances prong and indicate that Newcomer’s 
actions were reasonable when considering the full picture. 
Focusing on the reasonableness of Newcomer’s acts would provide 
  
 229 See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text. 
 230 Bencks, supra note 143. 
 231 See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text. 
 232 Lee, supra note 138 (“Newcomer contended Wintermyer was pulling a 
weapon, later determined to be a cell phone, from his pocket, according to defense 
documents.”). 
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a focal point for the jury’s inquiry into whether Newcomer acted 
in self-defense or whether he had removed himself from the law’s 
protection by provoking the incident. 
As in the case of Newcomer, the Lowman case233 would also 
turn on the specific facts of the encounter. It appears that the 
Lowmans knew the victim and had invited him into their home 
before the incident. What they understood of the man’s personality 
and mental state, plus their relation to him, would inform the 
reasonableness of trying to confront him when he began hitting the 
car with a metal pipe. As with Newcomer, the action does not 
appear to be particularly reasonable on its face. The attacker was 
in the process of smashing the Lowmans’ car with a metal pipe 
when Roy Lowman approached him.234 This apparently followed an 
argument between the Lowmans and the man.235 Lowman could 
have remained in his home and simply called the police. But 
instead, he left his home to confront the victim. Inserting himself 
into that situation to protect property seems unreasonable, though 
a jury could potentially find differently on that point alone. 
Further, additional facts about the Lowmans’ relationship with the 
man, their knowledge of his mental state, the manner in which 
Lowman approached, and what Lowman said would all inform the 
jury’s determination in such a case. When viewed in the totality of 
circumstances, even an apparently reckless act could be 
reasonable. It is through such a reasonableness inquiry that a jury 
would be able to best determine the extent to which Mr. Lowman’s 
actions ought to be protected by the law of self-defense. Regardless 
of the actual outcome in any given case, focusing the jury’s inquiry 
on the reasonableness of the defendant’s allegedly provocative 
actions given the totality of circumstances provides the best course 
for implementing society’s “collective sense of justice.”236  
D. Reasonableness as a Gloss on the Existing Frames 
This note proposes that jurisdictions ought to adopt the 
Reasonable Provocation frame for determining matters of 
provocation. But even if not adopted as a stand-alone rule, the 
reasonableness standard can serve as a helpful gloss on the 
existing frames for determining provocation. Doing so would 
  
 233 See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text. 
 234 Pickens, supra note 146. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Robinson, supra note 5, at 1. 
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help to minimize the weaknesses intrinsic in each approach 
and create a stronger, more just application of each frame. 
Focusing on reasonableness under the Any Provocation 
frame would soften an otherwise strict rule regarding the 
defendant’s actions. Under the existing formulation, “[a]ny 
form of conduct by the accused from which the fact finder may 
reasonably infer that the accused contributed to the affray 
constitutes ‘fault.’”237 The revised frame would require proof of 
unreasonable conduct before a jury could find provocation. This 
presents an inherently fairer framing of the issue. It does not 
go so far as to require culpability—as might be required under 
other frames—and offers some measure of protection for 
nonculpable actors behaving within society’s norms and 
expectations. An actor need no longer be completely blameless, 
just reasonably blameless. This offers the jury a degree of latitude 
in determining when to withdraw the legal protections of a self-
defense claim and allows the jury to reach the most just result. 
Under the Straight Provocation frame, the 
reasonableness inquiry will aid juries in determining what 
exactly it means to be the aggressor within the meaning of the 
law. That is to say, behavior that could be described as 
provocative—which could include anything from firing a gun238 
to using profanity239—does not necessarily count as provocation 
unless it is also unreasonable given the totality of 
circumstances. Only then does the actor’s behavior constitute 
provocation within the meaning of the law. In some sense, this 
could be seen as merely substituting one ambiguous word 
(“reasonable”) for another (“provocative”). But jurors in self-
defense cases are already steeped in determining issues of 
reasonableness.240 The addition of another reasonableness 
inquiry will introduce less confusion into the jury’s 
deliberations than the need to make determinations under an 
entirely different standard. 
The interaction between the reasonableness standard and 
the Provocation with Intent frame is the inverse of the 
reasonableness standard’s interaction with the Straight 
Provocation frame. With Straight Provocation, reasonableness 
informs the determination of provocation. Under Provocation with 
  
 237 Smith v. Commonwealth, 435 S.E.2d 414, 416 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 238 La Farn v. State, 265 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954). 
 239 Scott v. Commonwealth, 129 S.E. 360 (Va. 1925). 
 240 See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text. 
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Intent, the frame informs reasonableness. An individual acting 
with the intent of provoking an incident to cause death or serious 
bodily injury is not acting reasonably. Thus, his behavior would 
not fall under the protection of the law. This is an instance in 
which the frame would help to define reasonableness instead of 
reasonableness helping to define the frame. The two standards 
are not necessarily incompatible, though determinations of 
unreasonableness may be broader than the extremely narrow 
focus of the Provocation with Intent frame. Put differently, 
conduct that constitutes Provocation with Intent will always be 
presumed unreasonable, but unreasonable behavior may not fall 
within the Provocation with Intent frame. 
CONCLUSION 
The law of self-defense is far from clear in situations 
where an individual may have provoked an altercation by 
deliberately inserting himself into a situation where violence is 
likely. Different jurisdictions frame the issue of provocation 
differently, so that conduct clearly deemed provocation in one 
jurisdiction would just as clearly be protected as self-defense in 
another. Yet all of the frames suffer from serious weaknesses. 
To create a clear and fair rule of provocation, jurisdictions 
should adopt a standard of reasonableness when weighing 
questions of provocation. Under that standard, a defendant’s 
self-defense claim would first be analyzed for facial 
reasonableness. This analysis would create a presumption that 
could be rebutted or affirmed by considering the totality of 
circumstances. A defendant would be precluded from claiming 
self-defense where his actions were found unreasonable under 
this two-pronged inquiry. Either as a stand-alone rule or as a 
gloss on the currently existing frames, this standard would 
preserve societal notions of justice while providing a measure 
of clarity to jurors and members of society at large. 
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